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Abstract: This paper investigates the economic implications of disruptions of one to ninety days to the 
supply of natural gas in Ireland. We assess the impact of a hypothetical gas supply disruption in both 
winter and summer in 2008 (with observed market characteristics) and in 2020 (with projected 
market characteristics). The cost of a natural gas outage includes the cost of natural gas being 
unavailable for heating and other purposes in the industrial and commercial sectors, lost consumer 
surplus in the residential sector, the cost of lost electricity in all sectors and lost VAT on the sale of gas 
and electricity. Ireland produces much of its electricity from natural gas and the loss of this electricity 
accounts for the majority of the cost of a natural gas outage. Losing gas-fired electricity would cost 0.1 
to 1.0 billion euro per day, depending on the time of week, the time of year, and rationing of 
electricity. Industry should be rationed before households to minimize economic losses, but current 
emergency protocols favour industry. If gas-fired electricity is unavailable for three months, the 
economic loss could be up to 80 billion euro, about half of Gross Domestic Product. Losing gas for 
heating too would add up to approximately 8 billion euro in economic losses. We also discuss some 
options to increase Ireland’s security of supply, and find that the cost is a small fraction of the avoided 
maximum damage. 
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The Cost of Natural Gas Shortages in Ireland 
1. Introduction 
Energy security is back in vogue. Concerns about rapid demand growth, resource scarcity, 
concentration of reserves in unstable or hostile hands, and adverse weather have reminded 
people that the supply of energy is not guaranteed. Such worries are often qualitative, 
sometimes even speculative. In this paper, we attempt to quantify the cost of a gas outage. 
What economic damage would be done if Ireland were without gas? The answer to that 
question is of obvious interest to people who are considering investing in improving Ireland’s 
gas security. However, the order of magnitude (large) and the method (replicable) should be 
of wider interest. 
Ninety-two percent of Ireland’s gas supply was imported in 2008 (SEAI, 2009). Any 
disruptions to the international flow of gas would have a significant impact on the economy. 
In this paper, we investigate what the cost and possible implications of such a disruption 
might be for the Republic of Ireland. Without speculating on the possible causes or the 
probabilities, we quantify the economic losses associated with being without gas for one 
day, three weeks and three months. We separately analyse the costs associated with the 
electricity shortages that would arise if the supply of natural gas were disrupted. We find 
that the disruption to the electricity supply which occurs as a result of a gas outage accounts 
for, on average, 86% of the total cost of a natural gas disruption in Ireland. We also compare 
the costs associated with three alternative electricity rationing policies. The results indicate 
that large savings can be made if the industrial sector is preferentially rationed. 
Preferentially rationing the residential sector is always most expensive. To our knowledge, 
this is the first and only empirical estimate of the value of natural gas shortages in Ireland. 
The number of natural gas customers in Ireland is increasing, especially in the residential 
sector. Increased availability and the reputation of gas as the cleanest fossil fuel have 
assisted this increase. Included in the total cost of a natural gas outage is the loss of 
consumer surplus for the buyers of gas in the residential sector and the loss of producer 
surplus for the suppliers of gas to the residential sector. We quantify the loss of both 
consumer and producer surplus over different time periods and we discuss the impact on 
households if gas were not available for heating and cooking.  
Two EU directives, one concerning measures to safeguard security of electricity supply and 
infrastructure development was passed in 20061 and the other, passed in 2004, is 
concerned with measures to safeguard security of natural gas supply.2 This, along with 
recent Russia-Ukraine gas disputes, has placed security of supply high on the agenda of 
                                                                                 
 
 
 
1  Directive 2005/89/EC (EU, 2006) 
2  Directive 2004/67/EC (EU, 2004) 
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many European countries. Security of supply can be defined as “an uninterrupted flow of 
energy to meet demand in an environmental sustainable manner and at a price level that 
does not disrupt the course of the economy” (Damigos et al., 2009). Given that Ireland’s gas 
demand is increasing and that Ireland is hugely dependent on natural gas imports, it is 
important to consider what the implications of a natural gas shortage might be. 
Security of the natural gas supply has received some attention in Ireland to date. In 1999 
Bord Gáis3 examined ways in which Ireland can meet increased future gas demand. In 2009, 
the Commission for Energy Regulation in Ireland (CER) published a report which looked at 
the security of supply issue as well as the quality of gas being imported into Ireland. Neither 
study considered the economic impact of possible gas supply shortages, however. To our 
knowledge, this is the first estimate of the cost of disruptions to the natural gas supply on 
the island of Ireland. 
This topic has been studied in other countries. Damigos et al. (2009) used consumer surveys 
to estimate Greek households’ willingness to pay for safeguarding security of natural gas 
supply in electricity generation. The results of this study, which was conducted using the 
contingent valuation method, indicate that on average consumers are willing to pay a 
premium of 7% of their annual electricity bill in order to ensure the supply of gas. We are 
unable to conduct such a study since no Irish data of this kind exists.  
In 2006 Ilex Energy Consulting, on behalf of the Department of Trade and Investment in the 
UK (DTI), published a report which investigated the economic implications of a gas supply 
interruption to UK energy intensive industry in the winter of 2005/06. The effect of the 
disruption on sectors upstream and downstream of energy intensive industries was also 
considered but the cost of an outage to the residential sector is not measured. Using a 
combination of interviews which were carried out with companies and trade organisations in 
the UK, as well as data published by the ONS, the report considers shortages lasting 1 day, 3 
weeks and 6 weeks. A disruption to industry lasting 6 weeks could cost £2.3 billion (0.18% of 
annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2006)4, assuming that almost all of the energy 
intensive sectors cease production but that the sectors directly upstream and downstream 
are unaffected. In such a scenario it is assumed that alternative suppliers/customers for all 
purchases/sales can be found at no extra cost. However, the disruption could cost over 
£10.5 billion (0.81% of annual GDP in 2006) if upstream and downstream sectors are also 
forced to cease production. Due to data limitations, we do not consider the cost of lost 
production or sales in upstream and downstream sectors.  
In 2007, Oxera prepared a report for DTI in which the cost of expected forced gas shortages 
between 2007/08 and 2020/21 was estimated for the UK. It was assumed that the loss is 
                                                                                 
 
 
 
3 Bord Gáis, established in 1976, is a commercial State body operating in the energy industry. It currently has 
over 630,000 gas and electricity customers (Bord Gáis, 2010a).  
  4UK GDP in 2006 was £1.3 trillion (ONS, 2008).   
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equal to the gross value added (GVA) foregone. The findings show that forced shortages in 
2020/21 could cost £612 million (or a net present value of £1.26 billion if discounted at 
3.5%). The NPV would be about 0.08% of UK GDP in 2020 as forecast by Goldman Sachs 
(2003). As the residential sector does not contribute to GVA, the cost of gas shortages to 
households is not included.  
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 describes the data and methods used. The results 
are presented in section 3. We discuss the implications of natural gas shortages in Ireland in 
section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Data and Methods 
2.1 Gas in electricity production 
In 2008, over 23% of Ireland’s primary energy demand was met using natural gas and almost 
55% of Ireland’s electricity was produced using natural gas (SEAI, 2009). Thus, it is important 
to assess the effect of a natural gas shortage on electricity availability. The ESRI’s electricity 
generation model IDEM (ESRI, 2010) is used to estimate the number and magnitude of 
blackouts in Ireland in the event of natural gas being unavailable for electricity generation in 
2008 and 2020. IDEM is a model of the dispatch of electricity. For every half hour, it balances 
supply and demand using a merit order curve, adjusted for priority dispatch, feed-in tariffs, 
carbon price, maintenance, and other relevant factors. As the Irish power system is relatively 
small, all power plants are separately represented.5 
For 2008, IDEM uses the observed half hourly electricity demand profile in ROI and NI 
reported by Eirgrid (2009a). The model forecasts the half hourly demand profile for 2020. 
The daily demand profiles for each year can be seen in appendix 1. For the purpose of this 
paper, IDEM is run so that that all gas-fuelled plants in both the Republic of Ireland (ROI) and 
Northern Ireland (NI) are inactive. To account for likely coincident gas shortages in Great 
Britain, we assume that no power will be imported through interconnection. This means that 
the Irish system can rely only on coal, peat, oil, wind and the small amounts of other 
renewables on the system. For both years, two scenarios are considered. In the first, 
Moneypoint6 operates at its 2008 availability,7 and in the second, it is assumed that all 
scheduled maintenance work at Moneypoint is postponed and it operates at full 
availability.8 For 2020, two further scenarios are considered: one assumes that installed 
                                                                                 
 
 
 
5  Ireland and Great Britain are interconnected, but this is irrelevant for the current analysis. 
6  Moneypoint, a coal-fired power plant, is Ireland’s largest electricity generating station. It is part of ESB Power 
Generation Business Unit. The total output capacity of 915MW is delivered by three 305MW steam-
generating boiler plants.  
7  In 2008, one plant operated on 318 days of the year, the second operated on 219 days and the third operated 
on 338 days. This represents 875 out of a possible 1095 days, approximately 80%.  
8  Full availability assumes that all 3 plants operate on 365 days a year.  
5 
wind capacity equals 2000 megawatts (MW), the other 6000 MW. In 2008 installed wind 
capacity was just over 1000 MW. For all scenarios, the observed 2008 wind profile reported 
by EirGrid (2009b) is assumed. We also assume that demand does not change in response to 
the electricity shortage. 
First we estimate the size of the electricity shortage on both a midweek and weekend day in 
January and July in 2008 and 2020. We also estimate the shortfall caused by 3 week and 3 
month gas supply disruptions in summer and winter in both years. In a situation where 
electricity supply cannot meet demand, the rationing of electricity could take different 
forms. We consider what the implications of these options might be. First, each sector could 
lose electricity in proportion to its share of overall electricity consumption. We call this 
proportional rationing. Second, electricity could be preferentially rationed in the sector with 
the lowest gross value added per unit of electricity (industry), or, in the worst case scenario, 
electricity would be preferentially rationed in the sector with the highest value added per 
unit of electricity (residential).  
We assume that the shortfall will affect ROI and NI in proportion to the amount of electricity 
used in each jurisdiction. In order to quantify the cost of electricity shortfalls we multiply the 
shortage in kilowatt hours (kWh) by the value of a unit of electricity. This value differs by 
sector and between ROI and NI. We find the value of one kWh of electricity, also known as 
the Value of lost load (VoLL), in the industrial, commercial and residential sectors in 2008 
and 2020. As in Tol (2007) and Leahy and Tol (2010), the VoLL can be determined by dividing 
the annual Gross Value Added (GVA) per sector by the amount of electricity used by that 
sector. In the case of households, we cannot measure GVA but we do value the time spent at 
non paid work. As in de Nooij et al. (2007), Tol (2007) and Leahy and Tol (2010), we assume 
that the value of time spent at non paid work is equal to half of the average wage after tax. 
Following Leahy and Tol (2010), we incorporate the Time Use in Ireland Survey (ESRI, 2005) 
in order to determine how people allocate time. We use the 2005 time use profile as a proxy 
for time use in 2008 and in 2020. For those who are not at home or at home and asleep, the 
cost of the electricity shortage is 0. For those who are working from home at any particular 
time, the cost of the electricity shortage is assumed equal to the average wage after tax. For 
all others, the value of time spent at non paid work is set equal to half of the average wage 
after tax.  
ESB (2009) provided the 2001 electricity use profile for the industrial, commercial and 
residential sectors in ROI. Taking annual electricity use per sector in 2008 from SEAI’s Energy 
Statistics Report (Howley and Ó Gallachóir, 2009a) and forecasted demand in each sector in 
2020 from the ESRI’s Sustainable Development Model for Ireland (ISus)9 we impute the 2008 
and 2020 profiles based on the 2001 profile. GVA per sector for ROI in 2008 and 2020 is 
                                                                                 
 
 
 
9  ISus uses both economic and environmental data to forecast energy use, emissions to air and waste out to 
2025. 
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taken from the ESRI databank (Bergin and FitzGerald, 2009). We calculate the value of time 
spent at non paid work using data on non agricultural wages after tax, also taken from the 
ESRI databank. We estimate VoLL per sector for NI in 2008 following the method of Leahy 
and Tol (2010). In order to calculate the VoLL per sector in NI in 2020 we assume the same 
growth pattern as ROI because published forecasts of GVA and electricity use for NI are not 
available. 
 
2.2 Consumer Surplus 
We estimate the cost of a gas outage in the residential sector in terms of consumer surplus. 
Gas represents over a fifth of all fuels used in the residential sector in ROI (SEAI, 2009). Its 
main functions are space heating, water heating and cooking. Previously natural gas was 
only available in the cities of Dublin, Cork, Limerick and Galway. It is now becoming more 
widely available in smaller towns. Bord Gáis, the state-owned supplier in ROI, has only one 
competitor in the residential sector: Flogas, which went nationwide in 2009. The 2004/05 
Household Budget Survey (CSO, 2008) allows us to analyse the characteristics of residential 
users of natural gas in ROI. A typical user is an urban dweller, is relatively well educated and 
earns a relatively high income. A more detailed account of gas users’ characteristics can be 
seen in appendix 2. In NI, gas is supplied to the residential sector by Phoenix and since 2005 
by Firmus Energy, a subsidiary of Bord Gáis. 
The value of a natural gas disruption to households is equal to the consumer surplus that 
would be lost if natural gas were unavailable for heating and cooking. Consumer surplus is 
the difference between the price consumers are willing to pay for a good or service and the 
price they actually pay. Thus, it is used as a measure of welfare that people derive from 
consumption of goods or services. Here we assume that all gas is lost and, as a result, 
consumer surplus falls to zero. We estimate the loss in consumer surplus for 1 day, 3 weeks 
and 3 months in 2008 and in 2020. Using data provided by Bord Gáis Networks (2009), we 
know the amount of gas that was demanded in the residential sector in ROI on each day of 
2008.10 Northern Ireland’s Utility Regulator (URegNI) (2010) provides data on annual Gas 
demand in the residential sector in NI and we assume that the daily profile follows that of 
ROI. Many studies including Baker and Blundell (1991) and Berkhout et al. (2004) find that 
the elasticity of demand for gas in the residential sector is inelastic. We use an elasticity of -
0.16, estimated by Asche, Nilsen and Tveterås (2008). We also carry out a sensitivity analysis 
in which we decrease the elasticity to -0.5 as this is the elasticity estimated for UK 
households (Baker and Blundell, 1991). We also increase the elasticity to -.01. An elasticity 
                                                                                 
 
 
 
10  The data are for the entire non daily metered (NDM) sector; however, Bord Gáis (2010b) provides estimates 
of the proportion of the NDM gas demand which is attributed to households at different times of year.  
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greater than zero would indicate that the demand for natural gas is elastic, which we do not 
believe to be the case.  
In order to estimate consumer surplus we need to know the price at which gas is sold to the 
residential sector. Howley and Ó Gallachóir (2009a) provide details of 2008 prices. For 2020 
we assume that prices increase by 5% as was assumed by Howley and Ó Gallachóir (2009b). 
ISus forecasts annual residential gas demand in 2020 for ROI. Again, we assume that the 
growth in demand in NI is the same as that of ROI. For both ROI and NI, we assume that the 
2020 profile follows that of 2008. This is realistic since the most important determinant of 
gas demand is weather (Diffney et al., 2009).  
 
Using the elasticity, the price of gas and the amount of gas that was demanded on a certain 
day/week/month, we can estimate the slope of the gas demand curve for each relevant 
period. Figure 1 shows the consumer surplus that was derived when the market operated 
without interruption on Wednesday, 16th January 2008. Here, an elasticity of -0.16 is 
assumed. The maximum amount that people are willing to pay is the point at which the 
demand curve intersects the X axis, (labelled Pmax in figure 1). Pc is the current price or the 
price per mWh that residential customers paid on that day. The area labelled “A” is the 
consumer surplus that is derived. In the case of a gas outage, we assume that the entire 
consumer surplus is lost. 
 
Figure 1. Consumer Surplus 
 
2.3 Producer Surplus 
In the case of a natural gas disruption, the local suppliers of gas will also incur a cost. For 
those who supply gas to the residential sector, the cost is the loss of producer surplus. 
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Producer surplus is the difference between the revenue received and the costs of 
production, i.e. the retail price multiplied by the amount of gas sold for a particular time 
period minus the wholesale price. The wholesale price is about 58% of the retail price (CER, 
2009).  
 
2.4. Reduction in Government revenue 
In 2008, residential users of electricity and natural gas paid VAT at a rate of 13.5% of the 
retail price per unit. For the purposes of this paper we assume the same VAT rate will apply 
in 2020. Thus, government revenue will be negatively affected if the supply of electricity and 
natural gas is disrupted. The fall in revenue will depend on the time of year at which the 
outage occurs and its duration. The amount of VAT lost as a result of an electricity outage 
will depend on the amount of electricity generated at Moneypoint and on the amount of 
wind capacity installed.  
We estimate the loss in VAT revenue by estimating the shortfall in the supply of gas and 
electricity and we multiply this by 13.5% of the unit price.  
We do not include the VAT that is paid on the sale of electricity and gas to residential 
customers in Northern Ireland as this loss in revenue is not borne by the Irish government. 
Industrial and Commercial enterprises in the Republic of Ireland do not pay any VAT on 
purchases of electricity or natural gas.  
 
2.5. Cost of natural gas and electricity outages combined 
For households, the total cost is the loss of consumer surplus plus the cost of the electricity 
shortfall as explained earlier. For the suppliers of gas to the residential sector, the cost is the 
loss of producer surplus. Government bear the cost of losing VAT revenue.  
For the industrial and commercial sectors we cannot estimate consumer surplus and 
producer surplus. Instead we estimate the cost of the combined gas and electricity outage as 
being equal to GVA per sector divided by annual electricity and gas demand, respectively, 
per sector.11 We multiply this term by the combined amount of natural gas and electricity 
which is lost in each sector for each relevant time period.12   
                                                                                 
 
 
 
11  This is similar to estimating the VoLL for these sectors except the term now includes both gas and electricity 
demand for each sector.  
12  The total cost to the industrial and commercial sectors includes the cost incurred by the suppliers of gas to 
these sectors.  
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We use the same electricity and GVA data as before. Bord Gáis Networks (2009) provides 
daily gas demand data for the Industrial and Commercial (non power) sectors in 2008. 
Forecasted gas demand for these sectors in 2020 is taken from ISus. Gas demand data for NI 
in 2008 is taken URegNI (2010) and we impute 2020 demand by assuming it increases in line 
with gas demand in ROI. Again, the profile for both ROI and NI in 2020 is assumed to follow 
that of 2008.  
The results are presented in the next section.  
3. Results  
3.1. The cost of electricity outages  
First we discuss the cost of one day electricity shortages,13 for which the full results 
(displayed as cost per person) can be found in appendix 3. The cost of an outage varies by 
time of week and year and by the type of electricity rationing that is pursued. Using 2008 
data, the cost of a 1 day disruption could reach almost €840 million or 0.45% of that year’s 
GVA if electricity is rationed in the residential sector first. One might expect that the cost of 
a one day shortage should not exceed 1/365th of annual GVA. However, the cost of the 
disruption places a value on the loss to the residential sector whereas GVA only considers 
output in the industrial and commercial sectors. The cost falls to 0.1% of annual GVA if 
electricity is rationed in the industrial sector first because the VoLL is lowest in this sector.14 
One day shortages are seen to cost more in winter than summer in both 2008 and in 2020. 
In the winter of 2020, the cost of a 1 day shortage could reach over €1.6 billion (0.6%) of that 
year’s GVA if electricity is rationed in the residential sector first.  
In 2008 Moneypoint operated 80% of the time. We refer to this as partial availability. We 
also estimate what the cost of lost electricity would have been if all 3 plants in Moneypoint 
operated on all days of the year. Because demand for electricity varies between midweek 
and weekend days, and at different times of year, we show how the cost of the shortage 
varies with fluctuations in weather and demand.  
Figure 2 shows the estimated cost of lost electricity caused by a 1 day gas supply shortage in 
2008. The proportional rationing bar indicates the cost of the shortage when each sector in 
both ROI and NI loses electricity in proportion to the amount it demands. The cost does not 
vary by partial or full Moneypoint availability in winter, however, some differences are 
observed in summer. If proportional rationing is used, the cost is highest on midweek days in 
January when demand in all three sectors (industrial, commercial and residential) is likely to 
be high. The cost of the shortage is also relatively high on midweek days in July when 
Moneypoint operates at partial availability. Although demand for electricity is lower at this 
                                                                                 
 
 
 
13  Wednesday is taken to be the representative midweek day while Saturday is taken to be the weekend day. 
14  In 2008 in  ROI, the VoLL for the industrial sector is €4/kWh, for the commercial sector is €14/kWh and, for 
the residential sector, the average VoLL is €24.57/kWh  
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time of year, the amount of electricity that tends to be generated by wind turbines is also 
lower. If electricity is rationed in the residential sector first, the cost is highest on weekend 
days in winter. This is because the VoLL for households is higher on weekend than midweek 
days.15 In each case, the cost of the shortage is highest if electricity is rationed in the sector 
with the highest VoLL (residential) and lowest when electricity is rationed in the sector with 
the lowest VoLL (industry).  
Figure 2. Cost of 1 day electricity shortage in 2008   
 
Figure 3 shows the estimated cost of a 1 day electricity shortage in winter 2020. As was the 
case in 2008, full Moneypoint availability has no effect on the cost of the shortage. For 2020, 
two scenarios are considered. In the first only 2000 MW of wind are installed while in the 
second, wind capacity is increased to 6000 MW. Figure 3 shows that the main differences in 
cost can be attributed to the amount of wind capacity that will be installed. Appendix 3 
indicates that on weekdays, about 28% more demand is met if 6000 MW of wind are 
installed. At weekends, having 6000 MW of wind means 57% of demand can be met whereas 
only 42% will be met with 2000 MW of wind. The increased wind capacity reduces the cost 
of the blackout by 28% on weekdays and 36% on weekends. As was the case in 2008, the 
cost is highest on weekend days if households are rationed first whereas with proportional 
rationing, the cost is highest on midweek days.  
                                                                                 
 
 
 
15  The VoLL for households is the value of time spent at non paid work divided by electricity use. It is higher at 
weekends because fewer people are engaged in paid work. A higher value is placed on a unit of domestic 
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Figure 3. Cost of 1 day electricity shortage in winter 2020  
 
Figure 4 displays the estimated cost of a 1 day electricity shortage on summer days in 2020. 
In this case, full Moneypoint availability plays a role in reducing the cost of the shortage. 
However, the main differences in cost are brought about by the amount of wind capacity. 
On a midweek day with partial Moneypoint availability, the cost of the shortage with 2000 
MW of wind are double that of the 6000 MW wind scenario. With full Moneypoint 
availability, the difference in costs between the low and high wind scenarios is slightly 
higher. At weekends, even greater cost differences are observed. With partial Moneypoint 
availability, the cost of the shortage with low wind is almost twice that of high wind and with 
full Moneypoint availability, the cost of the shortage with low wind is about 3 times higher 
than it would be with 6000 MW of wind installed. Rationing the residential sector first is 
always more costly than other types of rationing, especially on weekend days with the low 
wind scenario. This happens because the average Voll for households on weekend days in 
July is €31/kWh whereas on midweek days it is only €20/kWh. 
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Figure 4. Cost of 1 day electricity shortage in summer 2020   
 
We also consider shortages lasting 3 weeks and 3 months of which detailed results 
(displayed as cost per person) are outlined in appendix 4. Figure 5 shows the estimated cost 
of a 3 week and 3 month electricity shortage in 2008. First, we compare the cost of a 
shortage beginning on 7th January 2008 for 3 weeks with one beginning on the 7th of July. 
Although demand is higher in the winter period, the amount of electricity that was 
generated by wind was relatively low in July 2008 and so, the cost of the shortage is 
somewhat similar across periods. If electricity is rationed in the residential sector, the cost of 
the shortage varies between €16 and €19 million (9-10% of GVA) in both periods. If 
proportional rationing is used the cost is only about 5% of annual GVA (or almost €10 
million). The cost falls substantially if electricity is rationed in the industrial sector first.  
We also compare the costs of an outage lasting for 3 months in winter (December, January, 
February) and summer (June, July, August). For a 3 month outage, the differences between 
costs of winter and summer outages are small. This is probably due to the fact that not all of 
the wind capacity that was on the system could be exploited in summer of 2008, even 
though demand was substantially lower in summer than winter. Again, the cost of a 
shortage varies dramatically depending on the type of rationing pursued.  
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Figure 5. Cost of 3 week and 3 month electricity shortages in 2008  
 
Figure 6 shows the cost of a 3 week shortage in 2020. As in 2008, 3 weeks in January and July 
are analysed. Again, it is the case that the cost of the shortage will be lower if 6000 MW of 
wind are installed. However, potential to produce electricity from wind in summer is 
reduced, and so, our results show that the cost of a shortage in summer can actually exceed 
that of winter.  
 
Figure 6. Cost of 3 week electricity shortages in 2020  
 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
Winter Partial MP Winter Full MP Summer Partial MP Summer Full MP Winter Partial MP Winter Full MP Summer Partial MP SummerFull MP 
€ 
B
ill
io
ns
 
Proportional Rationing Residential first Industry first 
3 week outage  3 month outage  
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
   Partial MP 2GW 
wind 
   Partial MP 6GW 
wind 
   Full MP 2GW wind    Full MP 6GW wind    Partial MP 2GW 
wind 
  Partial MP 6GW 
wind 
  Full MP 2GW wind   Full MP 6GW wind 
€ 
B
ill
io
ns
 
Proportional Rationing Residential first Industry first 
Winter 2020 Summer 2020 
14 
The costs of a 3 month gas shortage in 2020 are displayed in figure 7. The same months are 
chosen in both 2008 and 2020. If either proportional rationing or residential rationing is 
pursued, the cost of the outage is highest in summer when only 2000 MW of wind are 
installed. In winter, the cost is almost as high but more wind can be used to meet the 
shortfall in electricity. If industrial rationing is pursued, the cost is highest in the low wind, 
winter scenario.  
 
Figure 7. Cost of 3 month electricity shortages in 2020  
 
Whether the shortage lasts 1 day, 3 weeks or 3 months the best response is to ration 
electricity in the industrial sector first and then the commercial sector (as it has the next 
lowest VoLL). Because the VoLL is highest for households, this sector should be left 
unaffected for as long as possible. It would be cheaper to ration electricity in proportion to 
usage in all sectors than to cut off residential users first. Results also show that the cost of an 
electricity shortage is higher in 2020 than in 2008 if only 2000 MW of wind are installed by 
2020. However, if 6000 MW of wind are installed, then, the costs in 2020 could be lower 
than the costs of similar shortages in 2008.   
 
3.2 Consumer Surplus and Producer Surplus 
We have examined the cost of losing electricity as a result of a disruption to the natural gas 
supply in the residential sector. However, households also use natural gas for heating and 
cooking. Table 1 displays the consumer surplus that is lost as a result of a natural gas 
disruption to the residential sector for various time periods. With regard to one day outages, 
the loss is greatest in winter on midweek days, however in summer, bigger losses can be 
observed at weekends. As expected, if outages are to last 3 weeks or 3 months, the loss in 
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winter far outweighs that of summer. This is because more gas is demanded in winter for 
space heating and water heating. The cost of an outage in 2020 is expected to far exceed 
that of 2008. This is mainly driven by the expected increase in gas usage and natural gas 
connections in both ROI and NI.  
 
Table 1. Loss of consumer surplus as a result of residential gas outages  
Elasticity = -0.16 €s €s €s 
2008 ROI NI Total 2008* 
1 day    
Midweek winter 8,237,231 1,656,415 9,893,645 
Weekend winter 6,256,090 1,258,030 7,514,120 
Midweek summer 1,489,279 299,477 1,788,756 
Weekend summer 1,629,835 327,741 1,957,576 
3 weeks    
Winter 160,511,007 32,276,961 192,787,969 
Summer 34,196,207 6,876,473 41,072,680 
3 months    
Winter 680,020,558 136,744,499 816,765,056 
Summer 152,181,154 30,601,921 182,783,076 
    
2020 ROI NI Total 2020* 
1 day    
Midweek winter 16,575,412 3,333,129 19,908,541 
Weekend winter 12,588,852 2,531,477 15,120,329 
Midweek summer 2,977,725 598,787 3,576,512 
Weekend summer 3,258,758 655,300 3,914,058 
3 weeks    
Winter 322,989,148 64,949,491 387,938,640 
Summer 68,373,299 13,749,103 82,122,402 
3 months    
Winter 1,368,375,068 275,164,862 1,643,539,930 
Summer 304,277,247 61,186,738 365,463,985 
 *Constant prices, 2004=100 
Table 1 assumes that the price elasticity of demand for natural gas is -0.16. Table 2 shows 
that consumer surplus increases significantly if the elasticity changes to -0.01. Although still 
inelastic, an elasticity closer to zero means that demand is more responsive to changes in 
price and so, at higher prices, consumers reduce their consumption of natural gas. 
Alternatively, an elasticity of -.50 results in a much lower consumer surplus because 
consumers react weakly to changes in price. 
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Table 2. Consumer surplus sensitivity analysis 
Elasticity  -0.50 -0.01 
 2008 2020 2008 2020 
 €s €s €s €s 
1 day     
Midweek winter 3,489,991 7,022,754 156,319,593 314,554,951 
Weekend winter 2,650,612 5,333,708 118,723,094 238,901,193 
Midweek summer 630,985 1,261,618 28,262,346 56,508,895 
Weekend summer 690,537 1,380,687 30,929,701 61,842,114 
3 weeks     
Winter 68,006,112 136,845,669 3,046,049,907 6,129,430,505 
Summer 14,488,421 28,968,744 648,948,341 1,297,533,954 
3 months     
Winter 288,114,534 579,760,040 12,904,887,892 25,967,930,896 
Summer 64,476,878 128,917,716 2,887,972,594 5,774,330,966 
 
Table 3 shows the losses that suppliers of gas to the residential sector face in the case of a 
natural gas disruption. The highest losses coincide with periods of highest demand.  
 
Table 3. Loss of producer surplus for suppliers of residential gas 
2008 ROI NI Total 2008* 
 €s €s €s 
1 day    
Midweek winter 1,231,877 247,717 1,479,594 
Weekend winter 935,598 188,138 1,123,736 
Midweek summer 216,074 43,450 259,524 
Weekend summer 236,466 47,551 284,017 
3 weeks    
Winter 24,004,404 4,827,016 28,831,420 
Summer 4,961,395 997,681 5,959,076 
3 months    
Winter 101,697,000 20,450,125 122,147,125 
Summer 22,079,375 4,439,914 26,519,290 
    
2020 ROI NI Total 2020* 
1 day    
Midweek winter 2,247,029 451,852 2,698,881 
Weekend winter 1,706,595 343,177 2,049,772 
Midweek summer 403,672 81,174 484,846 
Weekend summer 441,770 88,835 530,605 
3 weeks    
Winter 43,785,701 8,804,813 52,590,514 
Summer 9,268,958 1,863,883 11,132,841 
3 months    
Winter 185,502,398 37,302,449 222,804,847 
Summer 41,249,041 8,294,719 49,543,760 
*Constant prices, 2004=100 
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3.3. Reduction in government revenue 
Table 4 shows the effect of gas and electricity shortages on government revenue in the 
Republic of Ireland. As stated previously, only residential users of gas and electricity are 
required to pay VAT at 13.5%. Industrial and commercial enterprises in the Republic of 
Ireland do not pay any VAT on electricity or natural gas. The degree to which VAT falls 
depends on the duration of the outage, the time of year at which the outage occurs and the 
amount of wind on the system. Moneypoint availability is only important for outages that 
occur during the summer. As expected, losses are generally higher in winter than in summer. 
However, in 2020 we see that lost VAT on the sale of electricity can be greater in summer 
than in winter. This happens because in summer a lack of wind hinders the production of 
wind powered electricity. Thus, the gap between the supply and demand for electricity can 
be larger in winter than in summer, even if the total level of demand is higher in winter.  
 
Table 4. Reduction in VAT revenue 
2008 Lost revenue: VAT on Gas Lost revenue: VAT on Electricity 
 €s €s 
1 day  Partial MP Full MP 
Midweek winter 387,654 1,070,530 1,070,530 
Weekend winter 294,419 785,343 785,343 
Midweek 
summer 67,995 1,171,186 992,195 
Weekend 
summer 74,413 711,063 542,043 
3 weeks    
Winter 7,553,833 18,968,891 18,371,980 
Summer 1,561,278 20,948,537 18,433,734 
3 months    
Winter 6,948,055 81,028,124 76,117,683 
Summer 32,002,553 84,657,690 73,749,401 
   
2020 Lost revenue: VAT on Gas Lost revenue: VAT on Electricity 
 €s €s 
1 day  Partial MP 2GW wind 
Full MP 2 
GW wind 
Partial MP 
6GW wind 
Full MP 6 
GW wind 
Midweek winter 707,107 1,920,768 1,920,768 1,495,860 1,495,860 
Weekend winter 537,040 1,592,019 1,592,019 1,167,032 1,167,032 
Midweek 
summer 127,030 1,708,420 1,520,480 850,529 703,838 
Weekend 
summer 139,019 1,453,819 1,092,635 510,291 287,544 
3 weeks      
Winter 13,778,717 32,484,655 32,484,655 15,677,551 15,677,551 
Summer 2,916,805 38,926,837 32,901,679 27,113,990 21,472,053 
3 months      
Winter 58,374,880 137,175,112 137,175,112 73,477,593 73,477,593 
Summer 12,980,467 156,343,957 137,133,855 108,582,156 89,042,665 
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3.4 The total cost of a natural gas disruption 
The total cost of a natural gas disruption includes the cost of both lost electricity and lost 
natural gas. For the residential sector, the cost of the natural gas outage and the subsequent 
electricity outage are estimated separately. As stated earlier however, we estimate the value 
of a unit of energy (gas and electricity) to the industrial and commercial sectors by dividing 
GVA by electricity and gas demand combined and we multiply this term by the kWhs of 
energy that are lost over a particular time period. We estimate the total cost of a natural gas 
disruption assuming that rationing is carried out in proportion to the amount of electricity 
and gas demanded in each sector in ROI and NI. On average, the cost of proportional 
rationing is about 60% of the cost that would result if rationing were carried out in the 
residential sector first. On the other hand, rationing the industrial sector first would cost 
about 50% of that of proportional rationing, on average.  
The costs of natural gas disruptions over different time periods in 2008 and 2020 are 
displayed in appendix 5. The cost of the electricity outage is also shown for comparison 
purposes. As expected, the cost of an outage is greater in winter than summer due to higher 
demand. Also, the cost is greater on midweek days than it is on weekend days. This can be 
attributed to the fact that disruptions to the industrial and commercial sector are more 
costly on midweek than weekend days. The table shows that the cost of electricity outages, 
caused by disruptions to the supply of natural gas, are, on average, 86% of the total cost of 
the disruption.16 In summer, the loss of natural gas in the industrial, commercial and 
residential sector add little to the overall cost of the disruption because the demand for 
heating by natural gas is very low at this time of year. 
 
4. Discussion 
4.1 Gas in Ireland  
Natural gas accounted for 13% of all energy used in Ireland in 2008 (SEAI, 2009) and it 
represented over 60% of all fuel used in power generation (SEAI, 2009). These figures are set 
to increase (see appendix 6). The majority of gas demanded in ROI and NI is currently 
supplied with imports from Moffat in western Scotland while the remainder is supplied from 
the Kinsale gas field and satellite fields off the south coast of Ireland. The first Scotland-
Ireland interconnector was built in 1993. The second, built in 2002, was intended to provide 
                                                                                 
 
 
 
16 Please note that these costs are not directly comparable. The value of a unit of electricity is derived by 
dividing GVA by electricity use. However, the cost of a unit of energy (gas plus electricity) for non residential 
users is estimated by dividing GVA by electricity and gas usage. Thus, the value of a unit of energy is lower 
than the value of an electricity unit. Nevertheless, the total cost of the outage will be higher than the cost of 
an electricity outage alone because the value of a unit of energy is multiplied by the number of units of gas 
and electricity that are lost. The total cost also includes the loss in consumer surplus.  
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security of supply in the event of a supply disruption to the first interconnector – it is 
therefore seldom used.  
The Corrib gas field off the west coast of Ireland is currently being developed. Corrib is 
expected to supply 62.8% of Irish demand (39% of peak day demand) when it goes live in 
2012 or 2013. However, it is also forecast that Corrib gas will decline quickly and reduce to 
less than 50% of its peak production within 6 years. Unless new sources of supply are 
brought on stream, Irish dependence on imports from Great Britain will rise again. The 
production of shale gas in the USA has encouraged some European countries to think about 
exploring the opportunity for shale gas in Europe. However, building the required 
infrastructure takes time and is costly.  
Shannon LNG proposes to begin construction on a liquefied natural gas (LNG) regasification 
terminal17 on the Shannon Estuary in Co. Kerry. At its normal operating flowrate, it would 
supply 60% of Ireland’s gas demand (Arup, 2007). A number of other potential gas prospects 
have also been identified in the Celtic Sea. The presence of gas in both the Old Head of 
Kinsale and Schull has been confirmed and technical and commercial viability is currently 
being assessed. Other potential prospects such as the West Dooish and Cashel prospects 
have been identified but the commercial viability of these has yet to be established.  
There is currently only a small amount of storage in Ireland at Kinsale (200 million cubic 
metres (mcm)) which accounts for about 3% of annual demand but this is expected to 
decline in the coming years. At the end of 2005, the average number of days of gas storage 
in Ireland was 11 whereas for the EU-15 it was 52 (CER, 2008). Islandmagee Storage Limited 
proposes to develop a 500 mcm salt cavity storage facility under Larne Lough. The first gas 
operations are expected to begin there in 2014.  
 
4.2 Implications of a natural gas shortage  
In this study we consider the cost of a gas shortage in terms of lost production. However, 
there may be other costs. If the shortage is prolonged there may be damage to equipment 
and plants (especially if weather is below freezing) and there may be delays in restarting 
production after the shortage. Ilex Energy Consulting (2006a) studied the effects of 
shortages on the industrial sector and pointed out that there may even be a loss of market 
share as some companies would be forced to relocate and job losses may result. We have 
not been able to quantify such costs in this paper. However, they are probably small. A long 
disruption of gas supply is more likely to be Europe-wide than limited to Ireland. Relocation 
within Europe would be pointless. 
                                                                                 
 
 
 
17  A regasification plant is one in which LNG is taken off of a ship, moved into cold storage tanks and then 
regasified back into natural gas to send to market. 
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Ilex Energy Consulting (2006a) noted that some sectors are able to run on back-up fuel and 
those that can generally have enough fuel for one day. These companies tend to be in 
refining, paper, steel, glass, some heavy food and some chemical industries. The amount of 
gas that needs to be retained varies by activity. Generally 10-20% of normal demand would 
be enough to keep some production going in most energy intensive industries but the likes 
of ammonia and aluminium would require a much higher proportion (Ilex Energy Consulting, 
2006a). However, there are low stocks of finished product in most sectors so even a 1 day 
stoppage would adversely affect downstream customers. It is likely that the same issues 
would arise in the commercial sector.  
Another consequence of a natural gas shortage is that increased prices may result for 
consumers. Depending on the industry, an increase in the price of gas may represent a 
substantial increase in overall costs and reduced production may result. Weak consumer 
confidence could also deter potential gas customers in all sectors. We have already noted 
that gas demand in the residential sector is inelastic. If increased prices are prolonged the 
rate of fuel poverty may also increase.18  
Disruptions to the natural gas supply will force those who rely on natural gas for space 
heating, water heating or cooking to further increase the demand for electricity, which 
would put further pressure on an already limited supply. Also, people may be forced to use 
old or inefficient heating or cooking systems which would increase the risk of fires or 
accidents. Fuel poverty and its associated health problems are substantial issues in Ireland 
but concentrated in poor households that use solid fuels as their primary source for heating 
(Scott et al., 2008). A gas shortage would disproportionally hit the better-off, who on the one 
hand are not used to coping with rationed energy but on the other hand would have the 
means to pay for alternative heating. It is likely, however, that a prolonged disruption of the 
gas supply in a cold winter19 would cause health problems for at least some people. Thus, we 
may have underestimated the costs associated with electricity outages.  
Gas supply disruptions in the past have encouraged countries to think about ways of 
ensuring long term gas security. One way of doing this would be to build a strategic storage 
facility. Ilex Energy Consulting (2006b) warns that a strategic storage facility should not be 
utilised in short periods of high demand. Instead the commercial market should be allowed 
to operate as normal and strategic storage should only be availed of in cases of persistent 
market tightness.  
                                                                                 
 
 
 
18  Based on expenditure, 15.9% of households in Ireland were fuel poor in 2005. The fuel poverty rate had 
increased to over 19% by quarter 1 of 2008 (Scott et al., 2008). 
19  Note that Ireland’s climate is very temperate; while night time temperatures regularly fall below freezing 
point, day time temperatures rarely do so. 
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The costs associated with storage include the initial cost of building the plant and the 
associated transport costs. The costs depend on the amount of cushion gas20 required as 
well as the capital expenditure. If one were to include transit costs from Europe to UK, for 
example, up to 1 billion pounds could be added to the overall cost (Ilex Energy Consulting, 
2006b). Ilex Energy Consulting (2006b) estimates the benefit of developing strategic storage. 
For a 3.3 billion cubic meter (bcm) plant with a 30 year life span which would be built over 3 
years, the net present value is £8.6 billion. This assumes a real interest rate of 3.5% but 
results show that a substantial benefit can be gained even if the interest rate increases. 
There are different types of storage options, all of which have advantages and 
disadvantages. The report published by Ilex Energy Consulting (2006b) shows that building a 
storage facility in a depleted field is cheaper than using salt cavern or LNG storage.21 It is 
thought that the storage facility at Larne in NI will take 7 years to develop at a cost of £250 
million. The plant (500 mcm) should be able to supply over 60 days of peak demand in NI in 
the case of a shortage. This same shortage would have cost over £6 billion in 200822 if 
rationing was carried out in proportion to usage across sectors. 60% of this cost would be 
endured by the residential sector. Based on these figures, a storage facility in ROI which 
could supply 90 days peak demand would probably cost about €1.35 billion.23 In comparison, 
a gas disruption resulting in electricity shortages for 90 winter days would have cost €51 
billion in 2008 if each sector were rationed proportionally. The cost would have been over 
€14 billion were the industrial sector preferentially rationed or, in the worst case scenario, 
the cost could have reached over €73 billion were the residential sector preferentially 
rationed. 
Due to Ireland’s location, ensuring new suppliers through the building of interconnectors 
between Ireland and countries other than the UK is difficult. The opening of the Corrib gas 
pipeline will increase Ireland’s security of supply but only in the short to medium term. If the 
Shannon LNG plant were to become operational it would serve average all Ireland demand 
for 25 days or all Ireland demand in retail and commercial sector for 116 days. According to 
Shannon LNG (2006), LNG in Ireland will enable the sourcing of gas from multiple sources 
which will lead to greater gas price competition. The project sponsors estimate that the 
Shannon project will have a lifespan of about 50 years and it is estimated that it would 
contribute €1.35 billion (in 2007 prices) to Irish GNP over a 30 year period (DKM, 2008). 
However, Moselle and Harris (2007) argue that benefits from LNG are not guaranteed. First, 
many commentators are of the opinion that LNG re-gasification capacity exceeds LNG 
production capacity and this trend is set to continue to the near future. LNG cargoes will be 
                                                                                 
 
 
 
20  This is the volume of gas needed as a permanent inventory to maintain adequate reservoir pressures and 
deliverability rates throughout the withdrawal season. 
21  To provide 3.3 bcm of storage a depleted field costs £1,843, salt cavern storage costs £2,485 and LNG 
storage costs £2,478. 
22  Total GVA in NI in 2008 was £28.7 billion (ONS, 2009). 
23  This is a crude estimate based on the NI figure. We impute the ROI cost based on storage cost per day of the 
NI project and we weight by the population. We then convert to euro assuming £1=€1.2 
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diverted towards markets with the highest prices and so, LNG terminal utilisation could be 
extremely variable. Second, the CER (2009c) estimates that the cost of Shannon LNG will be 
€10 per connected customer. Mosselle and Harris (2007), on the other hand, calculate that 
the cost will be €390 per customer, assuming that the cost of the project will be €400 
million. Even if costs are allocated in relation to the capacity of each customer’s connection, 
residential customers will still pay over €100 each (Mosselle and Harris, 2007). Also, if both 
Corrib and the Shannon LNG facility were in operation, the second gas interconnector and, 
perhaps even the first, would be redundant but Irish consumers would still be paying for 
them. This is another consideration that should be taken into account if investment in Shale 
gas infrastructure comes onto the agenda.  
We have not assessed the probability of a shortage in this paper. Recent commentary 
suggests that the main threat to the European gas supply is disruptions in the transport of 
Russian gas. However, since most of Ireland’s imports come from the UK and the UK in turn 
only sources 2% of its imported gas from Russia (Watson, 2010), one might conclude that 
Ireland’s gas supply is not inherently insecure. While indigenous production in the UK is 
expected to fall, the increased imports are not expected to be sourced from Russia (Watson, 
2010). In general, however, European gas demand is increasing and with that is Europe’s 
dependence on Russia. The Russia-Ukraine gas price disputes have already led to gas supply 
disruptions in several EU countries in recent years, the worst of which occurred in 2006 and 
2009. 
The implications of gas outages will vary by time of year and by the rationing policies 
pursued. Figure 8 shows the costs of a hypothetical electricity outage that arises as a result 
of a shortage of natural gas. Figure 8 shows how the costs would have been distributed in 
the winter and summer of 2008. If a gas disruption cannot be avoided, and if supplies of 
stored gas cannot be drawn upon, the best response is always to ration gas in the industrial 
sector first. The graph also shows that the most expensive outages do not coincide with 
periods of highest demand. This is because in summer, electricity production from gas 
cannot be substituted with wind to the degree that it can in winter.  
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Figure 8. The cost of electricity outages in 2008 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we estimate the cost of disruptions in the supply of natural gas. The cost of 
losing one day of gas-fired electricity amounts to 0.1-1.0 billion euro, depending on the time 
of week, the time of year, and the rationing scheme used. It would be cheaper to cut power 
to industry first, but current black-out protocols do the opposite. The cost of losing three 
months of gas-fired power could be as high as 80 billion euro or 50% of GDP. Losing gas for 
heating for three months would add another 8 billion euro on average. 
There are some limitations associated with the approach that we have used. We have not 
been able to take into account the costs associated with the extra time that may be needed 
to restart business/production processes after the disruption of supply. There may be costs 
of having to replace damaged stock or equipment which we have not quantified. We assume 
that the demand for gas and electricity do not change it the supply of electricity and gas is 
disrupted. We do not have a detailed characterisation of the use of electricity and therefore 
do not know the exact implications of a prolonged black-out; this particularly affects our 
estimates of the residential value of a lost load of electricity. The loss of electricity in one 
industry may adversely affect upstream and downstream customers but this is omitted from 
the analysis. In the case of a prolonged shortage limited to Ireland, a loss of market share 
may occur and investment into Ireland may be diverted elsewhere. However, a gas shortage 
is more likely to affect a wider area, in which case we ignore the impact of economic 
mayhem in Ireland’s international trading partners. We omit the implications of switching to 
alternative fuels, particularly for home heating, such as coal, peat and firewood. We also 
ignore the implications for health. 
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At present it is policy to turn off electricity in the residential sector first. Given that the cost 
of disruptions in this sector far outweighs those in the industrial and commercial sectors, 
this policy should be reversed. We have also shown that the demand for natural gas in the 
residential sector is inelastic and changes only in response to changes in the weather. This 
further strengthens our argument that the supply of gas to households should not be 
disproportionately rationed. In the case of a 3 month gas supply outage in the winter of 
2020, over €6 billion could be saved if electricity were rationed in the industrial rather than 
the residential sector.  
The demand for natural gas in Ireland is increasing. New sources of supply are coming on 
stream that will increase Ireland’s security of supply and will reduce Ireland’s dependence 
on imported gas. There are costs and risks associated with investing in new infrastructure 
and even then Ireland will not be totally self-sufficient in the supply of gas. Yet, by having a 
more diverse supply Ireland will be less vulnerable if disruptions to the international gas 
supply occur. The current level of gas storage in Ireland is inadequate, thus prohibiting any 
mitigation of the high costs of gas disruptions. We have shown that the costs associated with 
gas disruptions in Ireland would far outweigh the cost of investing in a 90 day storage 
facility. 
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Appendix 1a. Weekly electricity demand profiles 2008 and 2020 
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Appendix 1b. Monthly electricity demand profiles 2008 and 2020 
2,500,000
2,700,000
2,900,000
3,100,000
3,300,000
3,500,000
3,700,000
3,900,000
4,100,000
Januray February March April May June July August September October November December
m
W
h/
m
on
th
Monthly demand
2008
2020
29 
Appendix 2. Characteristics of natural gas customers in the residential sector 
 All households Households with gas Gas users as % of total 
 Freq. % Freq. %  
Number of households 6884 100 2046 100 29.72% 
Region      
Border, Midland And West 2,014 29.3 107 5.23 5.31% 
South West, South East, Mid 
West, Mid East 2,893 42.09 604 29.52 20.88% 
Dublin 1,967 28.62 1,335 65.25 67.87% 
Urban /Rural      
Urban Households 4,523 65.8 1,954 95.5 43.20% 
Rural Non-Farm Households 1,731 25.18 52 2.54 3.00% 
Rural Farm Households 620 9.02 40 1.96 6.45% 
Tenure      
Owned Outright 3,223 46.89 717 35.04 22.25% 
Owned Mortgage 2,441 35.51 866 42.33 35.48% 
Owned Tenant Purchase Scheme 35 0.51 16 0.78 45.71% 
Rent Local Authority 475 6.91 171 8.36 36.00% 
Rent Private Owner - Furnished 515 7.49 216 10.56 41.94% 
Rent Private Owner - 
Unfurnished 113 1.64 36 1.76 31.86% 
Rent Free 72 1.05 24 1.17 33.33% 
Type Of Accommodation      
Bedsitter 10 0.15 3 0.15 30.00% 
Converted Apartment/Flat 61 0.89 27 1.32 44.26% 
Large Block Custom Built 
Apartment/Flat 48 0.7 27 1.32 56.25% 
Small Block Custom Built 
Apartment/Flat 51 0.74 19 0.93 37.25% 
Detached House 3,577 52.04 356 17.4 9.95% 
Semi-Detached/Terraced House 3,098 45.07 1,602 78.3 51.71% 
Other 29 0.42 12 0.59 41.38% 
No Bedrooms      
0 9 0.13 3 0.15 33.33% 
1 186 2.71 74 3.62 39.78% 
2 739 10.75 303 14.81 41.00% 
3 3,008 43.76 1,001 48.92 33.28% 
4 2,213 32.19 523 25.56 23.63% 
5 532 7.74 109 5.33 20.49% 
6 133 1.93 22 1.08 16.54% 
7 42 0.61 9 0.44 21.43% 
8 12 0.017 2 0.1 16.67% 
No Children Under 17      
0 4,067 59.16 1,224 59.82 30.10% 
1 987 14.36 305 14.91 30.90% 
2 1,008 14.66 307 15 30.46% 
3 577 8.39 158 7.72 27.38% 
4 181 2.63 37 1.81 20.44% 
5 41 0.6 9 0.44 21.95% 
6 6 0.09 4 0.2 66.67% 
7 or more 7 0.1 2 0.1 28.57% 
No Persons      
1 1,361 19.8 428 20.92 31.45% 
2 1,895 27.57 574 28.05 30.29% 
3 1,185 17.24 378 18.48 31.90% 
30 
 All households Households with gas Gas users as % of total 
 Freq. % Freq. %  
4 1,214 17.66 356 17.4 29.32% 
5 770 11.2 213 10.41 27.66% 
6 324 4.71 74 3.62 22.84% 
7 84 1.22 14 0.68 16.67% 
8 or more 41 0.6 9 0.44 21.95% 
Single parent 254 3.7 100 4.89 39.37% 
Age Chief Economic Supporter 
(CES)      
15-24 Years 305 4.44 96 4.69 31.48% 
25-34 Years 1,115 16.22 412 20.14 36.95% 
35-44 Years 1,706 24.82 543 26.54 31.83% 
45-54 Years 1,421 20.67 398 19.45 28.01% 
55-654 Years 964 14.02 236 11.53 24.48% 
65-74 Years 805 11.71 220 10.75 27.33% 
75+ Years 556 8.09 141 6.89 25.36% 
Sex CES      
Male 4,440 64.59 1,270 62.07 28.60% 
Female 2,434 35.41 776 37.93 31.88% 
Social Class CES      
Professionals or Farmers >200 
acres 528 7.68 189 9.24 35.80% 
Managerial And Technical or 
Farmers 100-199 acres 1,921 27.95 676 33.04 35.19% 
Non-Manual or Famers 50-99 
acres 1,101 16.02 363 17.74 32.97% 
Skilled Manual or Farmers 30-49 
acres 1,317 19.16 305 14.91 23.16% 
Semi-Skilled Manual or Farmers 
<30 acres 678 9.86 181 8.85 26.70% 
Unskilled Manual 422 6.14 98 4.79 23.22% 
Other 907 13.19 234 11.44 25.80% 
Education level CES      
No Formal Education 21 0.31 8 0.39 38.10% 
Primary Education 1,333 19.39 283 13.83 21.23% 
Junior Cert/O Level 1,474 21.44 379 18.52 25.71% 
Leaving Cert/ A Level 1,825 26.55 541 26.44 29.64% 
Sub Degree 851 12.38 267 13.05 31.37% 
Primary Degree 776 11.29 315 15.4 40.59% 
Higher Degree 512 7.45 221 10.8 43.16% 
Missing education observations 82 1.19 32 1.56 39.02% 
  Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. 
Weekly expenditure on 
electricity  12.83 0.12 12.59 0.22 
Weekly expenditure on gas  3.98 0.10 12.69 0.24 
Weekly energy use in kWh  506.27 4.85 579.76 9.24 
Weekly gross household income  987.96 10.18 1174.23 22.12 
Weekly disposable household income 843.28 7.95 972.81 16.53 
Source: CSO, 2008 
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Appendix 3. Cost per person of 1 day electricity shortage in 2008 and 2020*  
 Proportional Rationing 
Preferentially 
Rationing 
Residential 
Preferentially 
Rationing 
Industry 
Shortfall (% of 
demand) 
 €M €M €M  
1 day outage 2008     
Midweek Jan Partial MP 85 135 31 40.28% 
% GVA  0.05% 0.07% 0.02%  
Midweek Jan Full  MP 85 135 31 40.28% 
% GVA  0.05% 0.07% 0.02%  
Weekend Jan Partial MP 73 138 23 33.10% 
% GVA  0.04% 0.07% 0.01%  
Weekend Jan Full MP 73 138 23 33.10% 
% GVA  0.04% 0.07% 0.01%  
Midweek July Partial MP 79 124 32 46.65% 
% GVA  0.04% 0.07% 0.02%  
Midweek July Full MP 67 108 24 39.52% 
% GVA  0.04% 0.06% 0.01%  
Weekend July Partial MP 58 116 17 32.70% 
% GVA  0.03% 0.06% 0.01%  
Weekend July Full MP 44 90 13 24.93% 
% GVA  0.02% 0.05% 0.01%  
     
1 day outage 2020     
Midweek Jan Partial MP 
2GW wind 149 211 94 62.70% 
% GVA  0.06% 0.08% 0.04%  
Midweek Jan Partial MP 
6GW wind 116 164 73 48.83% 
% GVA  0.04% 0.06% 0.03%  
Midweek Jan Full MP 2GW 
wind 149 211 94 62.70% 
% GVA  0.06% 0.08% 0.04%  
Midweek Jan Full MP 6GW 
wind 116 164 73 48.83% 
% GVA  0.04% 0.06% 0.03%  
Weekend Jan Partial MP 
2GW wind 143 237 78 58.21% 
% GVA  0.05% 0.09% 0.03%  
Weekend Jan Partial MP 
6GW wind 105 174 57 42.67% 
% GVA  0.04% 0.07% 0.02%  
Weekend Jan Full MP 2GW 
wind 143 237 78 58.21% 
% GVA  0.05% 0.09% 0.03%  
Weekend Jan Full MP 6GW 
wind 105 174 57 42.67% 
% GVA  0.04% 0.07% 0.02%  
Midweek  July Partial MP 
2GW wind 113 163 69 59.04% 
% GVA  0.04% 0.06% 0.03%  
Midweek  July Partial MP 
6GW wind 56 81 35 29.39% 
% GVA  0.02% 0.03% 0.01%  
Midweek July Full MP 2GW 
wind 100 145 62 52.54% 
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 Proportional Rationing 
Preferentially 
Rationing 
Residential 
Preferentially 
Rationing 
Industry 
Shortfall (% of 
demand) 
% GVA  0.04% 0.06% 0.02%  
Midweek July Full MP 6GW 
wind 46 67 29 24.32% 
% GVA  0.02% 0.03% 0.01%  
Weekend July Partial MP 
2GW wind 125 232 59 58.00% 
% GVA  0.05% 0.09% 0.02%  
Weekend July Partial MP 
6GW wind 44 81 21 20.36% 
% GVA  0.02% 0.03% 0.01%  
Weekend July Full MP 2GW 
wind  94 174 44 43.59% 
% GVA  0.04% 0.07% 0.02%  
Weekend July Full MP 6GW 
wind  25 46 12 11.47% 
% GVA  0.01% 0.02% 0.00%  
∗ Constant prices 2004=100 
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Appendix 4. Cost per person of 3 week and 3 month electricity shortages in 2008 and 
2020* 
 Proportional Rationing 
Preferentially 
Rationing 
Residential 
Preferentially 
Rationing 
Industry 
Shortfall (% of 
demand) 
 €B €B €B  
3 week outage 2008     
Winter Partial MP 1,549 2,685 551 35.56% 
% GVA  5.19% 9.00% 1.85%  
Winter Full MP 1,500 2,601 533 34.45% 
% GVA  5.03% 8.72% 1.79%  
Summer Partial MP 1,597 3,054 507 41.15% 
% GVA  5.35% 10.24% 1.70%  
Summer Full MP 1,405 2,688 446 36.21% 
% GVA  4.71% 9.01% 1.50%  
     
3 week outage 2020     
Winter Partial MP 2GW 
wind 2,592 3,790 1,583 52.79% 
% GVA  6.73% 9.85% 4.11%  
Winter Partial MP 6K wind 1,251 1,829 764 25.48% 
% GVA  3.25% 4.75% 1.99%  
Winter Full MP 2GW wind  2,592 3,790 1,583 52.79% 
% GVA  6.73% 9.85% 4.11%  
Winter Full MP 6K wind  1,251 1,829 764 25.48% 
% GVA  3.25% 4.75% 1.99%  
Summer Partial MP 2GW 
wind 2,880 4,727 1,582 66.34% 
% GVA  7.48% 12.28% 4.11%  
Summer Partial MP 6K wind 2,006 3,292 1,102 46.21% 
% GVA  5.21% 8.55% 2.86%  
Summer Full MP 2GW wind 2,434 3,995 1,337 56.07% 
% GVA  6.32% 10.38% 3.47%  
Summer Full MP 6K wind 1,589 2,607 873 36.59% 
% GVA  4.13% 6.77% 2.27%  
     
3 month outage 2008     
Winter Partial MP 6,706 11,777 2,353 36.23% 
% GVA  22.47% 39.47% 7.89%  
Winter Full MP 6,300 11,063 2,210 34.03% 
% GVA  21.11% 37.08% 7.41%  
Summer Partial MP 6,557 12,702 2,050 37.59% 
% GVA  21.97% 42.57% 6.87%  
Summer Full MP 5,712 11,065 1,786 32.75% 
% GVA  19.14% 37.08% 5.98%  
     
3 month outage 2020     
Winter Partial MP 2GW 
wind 11,141 16,637 6,686 53.21% 
% GVA  28.94% 43.22% 17.37%  
Winter Partial MP 6K wind 5,968 8,911 3,581 28.50% 
% GVA  15.50% 23.15% 9.30%  
Winter Full MP 2GW wind  11,141 16,637 6,686 53.21% 
% GVA  28.94% 43.22% 17.37%  
Winter Full MP 6K wind  5,968 8,911 3,581 28.50% 
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 Proportional Rationing 
Preferentially 
Rationing 
Residential 
Preferentially 
Rationing 
Industry 
Shortfall (% of 
demand) 
% GVA  15.50% 23.15% 9.30%  
Summer Partial MP 2GW 
wind 11,697 19,401 6,354 60.22% 
% GVA  30.39% 50.40% 16.51%  
Summer Partial MP 6K wind 8,123 13,474 4,413 41.83% 
% GVA  21.10% 35.00% 11.46%  
Summer Full MP 2GW wind 10,260 17,017 5,573 52.82% 
% GVA  26.65% 44.21% 14.48%  
Summer Full MP 6K wind 6,662 11,049 3,619 34.30% 
% GVA  17.31% 28.70% 9.40%  
∗ Constant prices 2004=100 
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Appendix 5. Total cost of gas disruptions 2008 and 2020∗: Proportional Rationing 
 Total cost of disruption 
cost per 
person 
Cost of 
electricity 
outage 
only 
cost per 
person 
Cost of 
electricity 
outage as 
proportion of 
total cost 
1 day outage 2008 €M €M €M €M  
 Midweek Jan Partial MP 639 103 525 85 82% 
 Midweek Jan Full MP 639 103 525 85 82% 
 Weekend Jan Partial MP 537 87 452 73 84% 
 Weekend Jan Full MP 537 87 452 73 84% 
 Midweek July Partial MP 537 87 489 79 91% 
 Midweek July Full MP 473 76 414 67 88% 
 Weekend July Partial MP 429 69 361 58 84% 
 Weekend July Full MP 353 57 276 44 78% 
      
1 day outage 2020      
 Midweek Jan Partial MP 
2GW wind 1,086 160 1,012 149 93% 
 Midweek Jan Partial MP 
6GW wind 910 134 788 116 87% 
 Midweek Jan Full MP 
2GW wind 1,086 160 1,012 149 93% 
 Midweek Jan Full MP 
6GW wind 910 134 788 116 87% 
 Weekend Jan Partial MP 
2GW wind 1,007 148 970 143 96% 
 Weekend Jan Partial MP 
6GW wind 796 117 711 105 89% 
 Weekend Jan Full MP 
2GW wind 1,007 148 970 143 96% 
 Weekend Jan Full MP 
6GW wind 796 117 711 105 89% 
 Midweek July Partial MP 
2GW wind 780 115 764 113 98% 
 Midweek July Partial MP 
6GW wind 478 70 380 56 80% 
 Midweek July Full MP 
2GW wind 714 105 680 100 95% 
 Midweek July Full MP 
6GW wind 426 63 315 46 74% 
 Weekend July Partial MP 
2GW wind 874 129 846 125 97% 
 Weekend July Partial MP 
6GW wind 414 61 297 44 72% 
 Weekend July Full MP 
2GW wind  698 103 636 94 91% 
 Weekend July Full MP 
6GW wind  306 45 167 25 55% 
      
3 week outage 2008  €B €M €B €M  
Winter Partial MP 12 1,930 10 1,549 80% 
Winter Full MP 12 1,888 9 1,500 79% 
Summer Partial MP 11 1,791 10 1,597 89% 
Summer Full MP 10 1,623 9 1,405 87% 
3 week 2020      
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 Total cost of disruption 
cost per 
person 
Cost of 
electricity 
outage 
only 
cost per 
person 
Cost of 
electricity 
outage as 
proportion of 
total cost 
Winter Partial MP 2GW 
wind 20 2,881 18 2,592 90% 
Winter Partial MP 6GW 
wind 12 1,821 8 1,251 69% 
Winter Full MP 2GW 
wind  20 2,881 18 2,592 90% 
Winter Full MP 6GW 
wind  12 1,821 8 1,251 69% 
Summer Partial MP 2GW 
wind 20 2,975 20 2,880 97% 
Summer Partial MP 6GW 
wind 15 2,173 14 2,006 92% 
Summer Full MP 2GW 
wind 17 2,520 17 2,434 97% 
Summer Full MP 6GW 
wind 12 1,834 11 1,589 87% 
      
3 month outage 2008       
Winter Partial MP 52 7,601 42 6,706 81% 
Winter Full MP 49 7,281 39 6,300 79% 
Summer Partial MP 46 6,826 41 6,557 88% 
Summer Full MP 42 6,148 35 5,712 85% 
      
3 month 2020      
Winter Partial MP 2GW 
wind 84 12,395 76 11,141 90% 
Winter Partial MP 6GW 
wind 56 8,289 40 5,968 72% 
Winter Full MP 2GW 
wind  84 12,395 76 11,141 90% 
Winter Full MP 6GW 
wind  56 8,289 40 5,968 72% 
Summer Partial MP 2GW 
wind 80 11,795 79 11,697 99% 
Summer Partial MP 6GW 
wind 59 8,738 55 8,123 93% 
Summer Full MP 2GW 
wind 71 10,476 70 10,260 98% 
Summer Full MP 6GW 
wind 51 7,548 45 6,662 88% 
∗ Constant prices 2004=100 
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Appendix 6. Energy Demand by Fuel (2008-2020) 
Fuel Total Final Demand excl power generation (ktoe) Growth Fuel Shares % 
 2008 2012 2020 08–20 2008 2012 2020 
Coal 380 271 238 -37.3 3 2 2 
Oil 8,534 7,835 9,607 12.6 64 62 64 
Gas 1,659 1,778 2,056 24 12 14 14 
Peat 280 214 147 -47.4 2 2 1 
Renewables 254 348 381 50.4 2 3 3 
Electricity 2,294 2,249 2,569 12 17 18 17 
Total 13,401 12,695 15,000 11.9    
    
 Gross Electricity Consumption (gWh) Growth Fuel Shares % 
 2008 2012 2020 08–20 2008 2012 2020 
Coal 4,259 6,060 1,966 -53.8 15 19 6 
Oil 1,367 1,367 1,367 0 5 4 4 
Gas 17,363 15,275 19,448 12 60 48 62 
Peat 2,338 2,661 61 -97.4 8 8 0 
Renewables 3,539 6,631 8,738 146.9 12 21 28 
Electricity 
Imports 450 -2,822 1,230     
Total 
Generation 28,865 31,994 31,581 9.4    
Source: Walker et al. (2009). 
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